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resumo 
 
 
O custo das licenças de emissão de dióxido de carbono é um custo de 
oportunidade para as industrias afetadas, uma vez que essas licenças de 
emissão podem ser transacionadas no mercado. Particularmente no sector 
elétrico esta questão tem despertado a atenção do público, devido à 
possibilidade de incluir este custo de oportunidade no preço da eletricidade, 
gerando lucros adicionais para as centrais. Para avaliar a existência desta 
passagem de custos no recém criado Mercado Ibérico de Eletricidade, 
recolhemos dados sobre os preços das licenças de emissão de CO2, do 
combustível e da eletricidade, e utilizamos o modelo do vetor autorregressivo 
(VAR). Concluímos que há evidencia de passagem de custos do CO2 para o 
preço da eletricidade, sendo este ligeiramente mais elevado em Portugal do 
que em Espanha. A passagem de custos do CO2 parece ser maior no pico da 
carga do que na carga base. 
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abstract 
 
The cost of carbon emission allowances is an opportunity cost for industries 
affected, since these allowances can be traded in the market. Particularly in the 
electrical sector this issue has triggered public attention, due to the possibility 
of including this opportunity cost in the electricity prices, generating windfall 
profits for utilities. To assess the existence of this pass-through in the newly 
created Iberian Electricity Market, we collect data on prices of electricity, fuel 
and CO2 allowances, and we use a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) Model. We 
conclude that there is evidence of CO2 cost pass-through to the electricity price, 
being a slightly higher in Portugal than in Spain. The CO2 cost pass-through still 
seems to be higher at peak load than at base load. 
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I. Introduction  
 
 
Climate change resulting from human activity is one of the most important questions of 
the XXI century. The first step towards reducing emissions of greenhouse gases happened 
with the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol on 16 February 2005, where the European 
Union committed to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases to about 8% compared to levels 
registered in 1990, for the period 2008-2012. With the same objective, in December of 
2002, the Emissions Trading Scheme was established. Was thus determined that most 
allowances would be given free of charge, however a small portion would be auctioned 5% 
and 10% respectively in the first (2005-2007) and second (2008-2012) phases. The 
allowances would be distributed by six key industries: energy, steel, cement, glass, bricks 
and paper/card. The allowances will be traded in the market so that power plants can 
supply deficits or sell excesses. The final environmental outcome is exactly the same as 
would occur in the case of both companies (buyer and seller) use the amount of allowances 
that was allocated for each, but with one significant difference, because both companies 
benefit of the flexibility offered by the trade. Therefore, the CO2 allowances price 
represent, on one hand an additional cost for power plants that purchase allowances for 
supply deficits, on the other hand, also an opportunity cost for power plants, that received 
allowances for free, to use them and consequently are therefore impeded from selling them 
in the market. 
 The advantages of the EU ETS as a mechanism for reducing emissions are mainly 
flexibility, efficiency recorded at the level of costs and incentives for developing clean 
technologies. In fact, the EU ETS leads to reduction of pollution in a businesses and 
promote the development and diffusion of new technologies. 
In 2008, approaching  the end of the second phase, new talks started in order to 
decide the future of Kyoto Protocol, as well as the Emission Trading Scheme. With the 
creation of Directive 2009/29/EC, the electricity sector finds itself excluded from the free 
allocation of CO2 allowances in the post-2012 period. This decision relates to the ability  
this sector seems to have, to pass the cost of CO2 allowances to the cost of the final 
product, without incurring in loss of competitiveness. These transfers to consumers are 
known as “CO2 cost pass through”, and are defined as the average increase in electricity 
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price during a certain period of time, due to the increased cost of CO2 allowances. It is, 
therefore, very important to infer the true on this het. Thus it becomes important to 
determine if this sector can really pass the additional cost of allowances to the electricity 
price. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is study the existence of that transfer, to 
infer if the additional costs of CO2 allowances affect the price of electricity, i. e. determine 
if electricity sector can really pass the additional cost of allowances to the electricity price. 
Thus, the main aim of this dissertation is an historical analysis of the existence of 
pass-through of costs of CO2 to electricity price. As relevant market for our study, we 
consider the Iberian Electricity Market (MIBEL). This choice is not only due the lack of 
historical analysis on this market, but also because it is a market created recently.  
One of the conclusions to be draw is that in fact there is evidence of pass-through of 
costs of CO2 allowances to the electricity market, being a slightly higher in Portugal than 
in Spain. The CO2 cost pass-through still seems to be higher at peak load than at base load.  
With our results, we can have an idea about what will happen in the post-2012, 
after the implementation of free allocation of allowances. Despite the price of CO2 
allowances be reflected in the actual price of electricity, it may happen that these values 
become more relevant, and therefore may increase the price of electricity.  
The dissertation is organized as follows. In the section II we present a literature 
review. In the section III we describe the origin and development of the European Trading 
Scheme. In the section IV we present the operation and the features of the electricity 
sector, focusing on the Iberian Electricity Market. In section V we present the model and 
the results. In section VI, we conclude and give suggestions for future research. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
 The fact that the price of CO2 allowances represent an opportunity cost for the 
electric sector and the possibility this might be reflected in the final electricity prices has 
triggered several studies over the past years. These studies can be broadly divided into two 
types: those that perform analysis of possible scenarios, assigning multiple possible values 
to the price of allowances and considering different assumptions; and those who do their 
analysis based on historical values. 
 Initially we will focus on the first type. Within this type, we can divide the studies 
according to the countries to which they are applied. We leave for the end (of this type) 
those that are applied to the MIBEL or at one of the countries that constitute this market. 
 Several studies using computer models that simulating the operation of the 
electricity market, to study the problems mentioned. One is SIJM (2004) which was 
applied to the Netherlands. The author assume  that the amount of additional costs derived 
from the trading of CO2 emissions is fully included in the price of electricity, and 
concludes that the increase in electricity prices derived from emissions trading is 
determined by the factor of marginal production. Meanwhile, KARA et al. (2008), study 
the Finnish market and determine that the annual average electricity price increased by 
0,74€/MWh for every 1€/ton CO2.  
 BERIZZI et al. (2009) consider two market structures, perfect competition and 
oligopoly, for the Italian Market, and conclude that the increase in electricity prices 
resulting from emission trading is significantly more higher in oligopoly than under perfect 
competition. In turn, WALS et al. (2003 ), in their study on Netherlands, Belgium, France 
and Germany, assign different values to the rising of CO2 price, concluding that in all 
countries there is an increase in electricity prices. However, under oligopoly, an increase in 
marginal costs is not fully reflected in electricity prices, since the producers will partly 
reduce their mark ups. These authors also studied the relationship between the price of 
allowances and the amount of CO2 emitted by verifying that an increase in the price of CO2 
to 5€/ton represents a 10% decrease in the amount of CO2 emitted, for the four countries 
studied.  
 SIMSHAUSER et al. (2009) do a simulation for the Victoria region and determine 
that CO2 pass through rate is 78%. In turn GENOESE et al. (2007) develop an agent-based 
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analysis of the impact of CO2 allowances price in electricity price, using spot prices for 
Germany. They conclude that approximately 75-100% of the CO2 allowance price is 
passed through to the electricity price. 
 In their study applied to MIBEL, RENESES et al. (2008) formulate different 
scenarios for an inelastic demand, fuel costs and the availability of water in reservoirs, in 
the first phase, while in the second phase, they consider the water conditions as fixed and 
introduce scenarios for production using renewable. These authors conclude that an 
increase of 5€/ton in the price of CO2 causes an increase of 3-3.5€/MWh in the price of 
electricity for the first phase and 2,5-2,8€/MWh in the second phase. In turn, SOUSA et al. 
(2005) also on the MIBEL, concluded that it can be expect an increase in electricity prices 
mainly when there is coal power generation, and during off-peak hours. Finally, LINARES 
et al. (2006), applied their study only to the Spanish electricity market, and using a model 
of oligopoly, found that prices have increased about 20% due to the trade in emission 
allowances, and that investments in clean energy sources should be encouraged.  
 Let us concentrate now in research whose analysis consider historical data. The 
first work that should be mentioned is  FELL (2010), which is an application to the Nordic 
countries. He concludes that the response of electricity prices to changes in allowances 
price is generally significant and it will be dilute over time, at off-peak times. Furthermore, 
when the marginal production technology used is coal the transfer of costs is almost 
complete. In turn SIJM et al. (2006a) and SIJM et al. (2008) assume that all costs, 
excluding fuel or allowances, are constant, the market structure does not change, and the 
cost of fuel is fully reflected in electricity prices. SOLIER et al. (2011) with the same 
assumptions analyses this transfer for some European countries, including Spain, and 
conclude that this transfer is more relevant in the first phase of the EU ETS than in the 
second phase. Furthermore they find no evidence of cost pass-through in 2009 for all 
countries considered in their sample. The reason attributed to this result, was the financial 
crisis, and consequent instability of markets, volatility of prices and reduced demand for 
electricity. In order to verify to what extent the economic crisis will affect this transfer of 
costs, the authors conducted a further estimation using the forward prices and concluded 
that in this market there is evidence of cost pass-through. Although the year of 2009 had 
lower values comparing with others, confirming that the economic crisis may reduces  the 
impact of CO2 cost on electricity prices.  
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Electricity spot EUA spot
  
Calendar Gas EUA future 
 Recently presented at the 5
th
 Atlantic Workshop on Energy and Environmental 
Economics, the unpublished work of FREITAS et al. (2012) study the CO2 cost pass-
through in Portugal, using a vector error-correction model (VECM), and conclude that the 
rate of CO2 cost pass through is between 33-51%. 
 AHAMADA et al. (2012) study the economic impact of EU ETS on electricity 
prices, analysing futures prices in France and Germany, for the second phase (2008-2012). 
They identify a structural break in the series of carbon spot prices in October 2008, due to 
economic and financial crisis. They conclude that before October 2008, the impact of 
carbon prices is not significant in both countries. After October 2008 carbon prices 
strongly influences the price of electricity, an increase in the allowances price of 1% 
results in 0,19% to 0,21% and 0,13% to 0,14% higher electricity prices in France and 
Germany, respectively.  
 BUNN et al. (2007) conclude that one shock of 1% in carbon price causes on 
average one shock of 0.42% in electricity price on United Kigdom.  In turn, ABADIE et al. 
(2011) study the relationship between the price of electricity, natural gas, coal and CO2 
allowances price, and determine that the electricity markets incorporate the price of CO2 
allowances. And finally, ZACHMANN et al. (2008) prove the existence of asymmetric 
CO2 cost pass through in Germany, using forward prices.  
 Another way to determine the relationship between the  CO2 allowances price and 
electricity prices was presented by KEPPLER (2010), and KEPPLER et al. (2010) using 
the Granger causality test. These two studies  concluded that in the first phase of the EU 
ETS there is a causal relationship between the forward price of CO2 allowances and the 
future price of electricity (figure 1). This relationship is higher in base-load  because the 
coal (typically used in base-load power production) is more intensive in carbon (KEPPLER 
et al., 2010). In the second phase of the EU ETS, KEPPLER et al. (2010) find a reversal in 
the causal relationship between the forward price of CO2 allowances and forward prices of 
electricity, concluding that is the price of electricity that determine the price of CO2 
allowances. 
 
Figure 1 – Causality relationship between the carbon, electricity and gas markets, after one period 
(one day) 
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Source: KEPPLER (2010) 
   
 A common result to all papers mentioned so far is that an increase in the CO2 
allowances price causes an increase in electricity prices. Therefore, one of the main 
questions is also the impact of CO2 allowances prices on consumers. According to CHEN 
et al. (2008), the share of costs emission that is passed to consumers by increasing the price 
of electricity depends on the elasticity of demand, the price of allowances and also the 
market power. 
 BONACINA et al. (2007) focus their analysis on the effects that market structure 
has on the rate of cost pass-through concluding that the price of electricity on perfect 
competition internalise the marginal cost of opportunity of CO2 allowances. In imperfect 
competition this internalization can be smaller or larger than in perfect competition, 
depending on several  factors as: the degree of market concentration, the operated plant 
mix by each dominant firm or by the fringe, the price of CO2 allowances and finally the 
capacity available. In particular, with the results obtained, this authors argue that under 
market power the impact of ETS is higher than in perfect competition only if there is 
excess capacity and the share of most polluting plants in the market is low enough. 
Moreover, without excess capacity, the impact on the market power is less than perfect 
competition and decreases significantly with market concentration. Additionally 
CHERNYASVS'KA et al. (2008) argue  that the increase in the price of electricity due to 
emissions trading can also be higher or lower depending on the production capacity. 
PERRELS et al. (2006b, 2006a) reported that the spot price of electricity will naturally be 
less affected by increased CO2 emissions allowances price if more capacity is installed.  
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III. Origins and Development of EU ETS 
3.1  Theoretical and experimental foundations 
The intellectual platform is perhaps the most important aspect in the origin of the 
EU ETS, since the development of theoretical and applied studies on emissions trading, 
allowed to give the EU ETS the status of policy instrument. As one of the precursors of the 
study of the problems of social cost, we find COASE (1960), which suggests that the 
allocation of property rights, provides the use of environmental endowments which in turn 
can be traded and negotiated so that the final result is economically efficient. 
Years before PIGOU (1932) argued that the solution to correct externalities was the 
imposition of a tax applied on the activity causing the externality. This tax should be equal 
to the social damage caused by the last unit of damage created. A formalization of the 
ideas advocated by Pigou, was presented by BAUMOL (1972). The author demonstrates 
the veracity of the theoretical ideas presented by Pigou, however points out that there is 
still a long way to go before these ideas become operational, not only by the existing 
difficulty in calculating the marginal damage function, but also by the fact that can find 
more than one local maximum. Concluding BAUMOL (1972) says: 
“All in all, we are left with little reason for confidence in the applicability 
of the Pigouvian approach, literally interpreted. We do not know how to 
calculate the required taxes and subsidies and we do not know how to 
approximate them by trial and error.” 
This theoretical framework has gained more notoriety and expressiveness, as a way 
of creating the system of emissions trading, with the works of DALES (2002) and 
TIETENBERG (2006). DALES (2002) says that the solution to minimize this problem 
could pass by setting allocated quotas, expressed in equivalent tons of discharges, and 
these same quotas would be likely to exceed the total quota allocated to the region. 
However, these quotas could be traded in the market, and the outcome of the matching of 
aggregated offer and demand would set the price, and its signal would be a continued drive 
for innovation and efficiency. More recently, TIETENBERG (2006) summarizes the 
experience of the U. S., whose essence is on “learning by doing”. Indeed, it is often the 
search for solutions to the problems that give rise to the innovation. The emissions trading 
encourages both emissions-reducing innovation and the adoption of new emissions-
reducing technologies. 
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3.2 The role of the Kyoto Protocol 
Most of the Member States, institutions, green groups and industries of the EU 
were sceptical about the idea of emissions trading (SKJAERSETH et al., 2008). However, 
despite this initial scepticism, the European Union was one of the earliest supporters of 
reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases. The first signal of this shift has emerged in the 
spring of 1998, through communication of the EU Strategy for the post-2012, which 
determined the existence of an internal pilot phase for emissions trading, and reinforced the 
need for the EU to show improvements in climate policy during the year of 2005, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol (EC, 1998). In May 1999, with the 
publication of the document “Preparing for Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol”, the 
discussion of the possible creation of a domestic system of emissions trading has 
intensified. Initially, this system should be applied only to a few key sectors, and include 
only the CO2 emissions (gas easier to measure) and later would be gradually extend to 
other types of emissions (EC, 1999). 
 Issues such as the harmonization and the degree of centralized power, hitherto 
treated surface, subsequently receive more attention in the publication of EU ETS Green 
Paper (EC, 2000). This document alert to the need for a more centralized and harmonized 
market in order to encourage the ambition on the part of Member States in reducing CO2 
emissions. 
There are several reasons for the change of position by the European Commission 
in relation to emissions trading (SKJAERSETH et al., 2009). The main ones are: EU 
perseverance in defending binding numerical targets for reducing emissions; the 
commitments imposed by the Kyoto Protocol and the provisions for international 
emissions trading; the attractiveness of the idea of emissions trading; and the 
entrepreneurial behaviour demonstrated by the European Commission. The imposition of 
numerical targets required that the EU itself had a particular obligation to fulfil the goals it 
set itself. The entrepreneurial behaviour demonstrated by the EU was caused by the change 
of staff, which has consisted mostly of economists, who were receptive or supporters of the 
idea of emissions trading, and that worked to foster the rapid development of the EU ETS. 
Other reasons for change of mentality of EU are: the United States decision in vetoing the 
Kyoto Protocol, which fuelled a movement in support of Kyoto, credible for most 
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industrial emitters, and the growing recognition that the new climate policy instruments 
would be needed to achieve the Kyoto targets. 
However, the Kyoto Protocol is identified as the key factor. This agreement 
adapted the effort and turned it into real action as: the creation of a target of 8% reduction 
in emissions recorded in 1990; the introduction of flexible mechanisms, among which was 
the trade of allowances, as aids in meeting the goals; and finally the impetus for the 
creation of a burden sharing Agreement, which took place in June 1998 and which was 
attributed to each of the 15 Member States a legally binding order (CONVERY, 2009). 
The Protocol give to the EU a special impetus towards the adoption of emissions trading, 
also by the great economic opportunity that it represented, but in particular because it can 
lead to reduced costs of compliance with Kyoto targets (SKJAERSETH et al., 2009). 
However, although the EU ETS has been clearly linked with the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol, he was included in EU law so that its creation was independent of the Kyoto 
Protocol (ELLERMAN et al., 2007). 
3.3 Success in implementing the EU ETS 
The successful creation of the European emissions trading scheme was not 
predetermined. In fact, countries that were regarded as less complex and more cohesive 
than the European countries, like Canada or Japan, in both institutional and cultural 
contexts, failed. The success of European ETS is due to several reasons, including 
(CONVERY, 2009): the opposition to the proposed carbon energy tax, in the 90s; easy 
acceptance of emissions trading by the industry; creating their own systems by the United 
Kingdom and Denmark. The failure of the struggle against the inclusion of trade in 
emissions allowances as a flexible tool in the Kyoto protocol in 1997, and the existence of 
a single market, characteristic of extreme importance to the environment are others 
important reasons for the success of the EU ETS.  
Opposition to the proposed carbon energy tax emerged from two core elements. 
Several countries consider their autonomy with regard to taxation as a core value, which 
should not be called into question, even if the argument is the benefit of environment. 
Although the carbon energy tax have been presented as a special case, countries feared that 
the same happen in other tax initiatives and gradually the fiscal autonomy would be 
diluted. The chief representative of the industry at EU level, UNICE, was also against the 
carbon energy tax. The skill and persistence of the opposition allowed him to be strong 
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enough to remove the proposed carbon energy tax in 1997. And in 1998 the Commission 
published “Climate Change – Towards a strategy for the EU post-Kyoto” advocating that 
itself could establish its own system of internal trade in 2005 (EC, 1998).  
The creation of a single market also reinforced the urgency of addressing the 
environmental challenges that transcend national boundaries. The polluter pays principle 
has also received much attention, like the obligation to perform an analysis of costs and 
benefits of environment measures (DELBEKE, 2006). This created the legal basis for 
mobilizing the market in the direction of finding solutions to combat climate change. 
Finally, emissions trading has been welcomed by industry  due to the great effort of the 
EC to highlight different aspects of emissions trading among different stakeholders. In the 
case of the industry the argument used was the cost efficiency. Such efficiency could 
create economic opportunities because firms reduce emissions and thus can sell 
allowances. 
3.4 The difficulties that arose 
The main difficulties encountered during implementation of the EU ETS were mainly 
the decentralized approach that was implemented with the system of emissions trading 
(SKJAERSETH et al., 2009) and the lack of data at the emission installations (BUCHNER 
et al., 2006, ELLERMAN et al., 2007, MULLINS, 2005). 
One of the main features of the EU ETS, has been the decentralization with respect to 
the establishment of limits on the amount of allocated allowances and therefore the setting 
of emissions limit. This decentralized approach was the result of power sharing and the 
attempt of agreement between the European Commission and Member States. Thus, the 
final proposal was in fact more detailed about the decentralized setting limits on the 
amount of emissions, according to the proposal from the European Commission (Article 9 
of the ET Directive). Therefore the  allowances allocation was being done at the Member 
State level. A decentralized system can easily lead to over-allocation and consequently 
reduce the ambition to the mitigation of emissions. Thus, the key element for the creation 
of the EU ETS was the development of national allocation plans (NAPs). Each Member 
State is responsible for the preparation of his own, under the ET Directive. The European 
Commission here has played a less prominent role, particularly at the decision phase. But 
continued to play a central role, being very active behind the scenes of negotiations of the 
Council and working as a conciliatory party. Thus the EU assessing national allocation 
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plans and excluding any meeting that did not agree with the way forward to achieve the 
Kyoto targets in 2005-2007 and/ or were not in agreement with the proposed goals for 
2008-2012. 
Another problem that arose in the implementation of the EU ETS was the lack of data 
level of CO2 emitting facilities. It was with great surprise that most people realized the 
existence of this problem, because many countries had created reasonable inventory data 
for CO2 emissions. This problem was caused by two distinct situations. The first derives 
from the fact that the directive on emissions trading requires the free allocation of at least 
95% of allowances. While the second is because the existing data on CO2 emissions were 
based on aggregate energy use and were not segregated by facility. In fact countries like 
Sweden and Germany, which had already recorded data at the level of facilities to suit their 
aims, they found unacceptable flaws in their data (ELLERMAN et al., 2007). In fact only 
Denmark, did not suffer the problems of lack of data, since their data was already collected 
at the level of facilities to cope with their own system of emissions trading.  
The problem was compounded due to the lower limit – 20MW thermal rating – to 
include combustion installations in the EU ETS, to the difficulty in identifying all these 
facilities, especially in large countries with many facilities such as Germany (MULLINS, 
2005). Although the lower limit will minimize the distortion of competition between the 
power plants, intensifies the problem of data, because more facilities are included. 
BUCHNER et al. (2006) even state that in the short term, “...the inclusion of small 
installations was not worth it” however in the long run these facilities must be included in 
the EU ETS.  In fact the inclusion of small installations in the EU ETS causes two 
problems: the data for each installation are specific to that facility and the submission and 
verification of the data implies costs for small facilities that are very high in view of their 
low emissions and low potential of abatement.  
The unavailability of data at the installations level had consequences. One of these 
consequences was the lack of legal authority to collect relevant data. The collection of data 
directly from the installation combined with the reduced time limits for submission of 
NAPs, put the governments of Member States in a position of strong dependence on the 
voluntary submission of data by industry (BUCHNER et al., 2006). However, the affected 
companies cooperated as best as possible, which allowed this problem to be minimized. 
Another consequence was that some alternatives for the allowances allocation that could be 
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preferable, could not be used because they were simply impractical (MULLINS, 2005). 
The lack of data has led some countries to prefer to base the allocation on historical 
emissions. In fact some countries with greater availability of data selected years or base 
periods between 1998 and 2002, including the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden. 
While for most member states the baseline or reference period covers only some of the 
more recent years, in which data at the installation are available (BUCHNER et al., 2006, 
MULLINS, 2005). Despite the lack of data at the level of facilities have restricted the 
choices of allocation, the need to collect data on allocation and verified emissions of CO2 
resulted in significant improvement of data quality emissions and energy use. However, in 
contrast to other issues linked to the allowances allocation, the lack of data has been 
largely overcome. 
3.5 Allowances allocation 
 One of the most important political aspects of emissions trading was the allocation, 
particularly in the first time it was performed. The allocation, is the distribution of the total 
amount of emissions under the European Trading Scheme in the form of rights, licenses or 
permits. The method of allocation, by itself, has no implications on the functioning of the 
Emissions Trading Scheme, however the assignment determines who receives the 
economic value of patents (LEFEVERE, 2005). Two main different allocation options 
were on the table, including auctioning and grandfathering, and it was necessary to choose 
between them. 
 The auction was clearly the favourite of economists and also environmental NGOs, 
or by their effectiveness or the ease with which would be applied. However, this method 
was not the allocation method chosen due to industry opposition. According to 
LEFEVERE (2005), “this opposition can be explained by the fact that use of the resource 
which as previously free of charge must now be paid for through an auction, often at prices 
unknown at the time of the design of the scheme”. To offset the costs that the auction could 
impose on the industry was provided the recycling of revenues, or its neutralization with 
the imposition of fees, however this method was difficult to implement in practice due to 
the reluctance of Member States (VIS, 2006). The opposition of the industry, the pressure 
within the limited time available, the dependence of firms in relation to emissions data that 
were not collected so far, or the requirement that 95% of allowances were allocated free of 
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charge during the first phase of the EU ETS, dictated that only four European countries 
chose the auction
1
 (ELLERMAN et al., 2007). 
 As for the free allocation of allowances that can be based in three types (VIS, 
2006): historical emissions in a given base year(s); benchmarked emissions during a given 
base year(s); benchmarked emissions in a future year(s). 
 Free allocation is generally preferred by the industry (LEFEVERE, 2005). This 
implies that sources less often incur extra costs to the allocation and provides a valuable 
asset that can be used or sold. It is, however, the most difficult method to implement since 
it requires that the various interests are matched, not to put themselves at disadvantage 
plants that have already reduced their emissions in the past, or at advantage those who did 
not. Once the allowances have value, each of the power plants seek to maximize the 
amount of allowances allocated to it, trying to ensure they have the necessary amount of 
allowances to cover their emissions. This allocation method may have significant 
implications for the rules on state aid to EU, since valuable assets are allocated for free to 
the industry. 
 In turn, the benchmarking is a method that permits assigned as the value of the 
output produced, i. e., gives a number of CO2 allowances per ton of output produced in a 
given period. Thus indices are calculated from historical activity or capacity which is then 
multiplied by an standard and uniform emission rate for  determining the amount of 
allowances allocated each power plant (ELLERMAN et al., 2007). The benchmarking is 
not an easy option because it needs more information than other methods, including the 
verified emissions data and output produced. This data should be reported, at least to the 
regulator (VIS, 2006). Benchmarking have most decisive effects, is less effective in 
reducing emissions at lower cost and therefore is unlikely to produce a strong incentive in 
favour of renewal investment. In short, the idea behind benchmarking is that two plants 
with identical characteristics, differing only in emissions levels recorded, should be treated 
equally, i.e., should receive the same amount of allowances (LEFEVERE, 2005). However 
the existing facilities have specific characteristics that require the establishment of 
different benchmarks for different production processes. This requirement together with 
the problem of lack of existing data make this process of allocation too complex. Thus, 
despite the strong support existing in his favour, benchmarking was not the general 
                                                           
1 Including Denmark, Hungary, Lithuania and Ireland, to 5,  2,5,  1,5 and 0,75% of its total. 
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principle chosen for the assignment in the EU ETS. But yet there are some exceptions, 
notably with regard to new entrants in the market, who do not have a track record of 
emissions, and Spain, where many industries were benchmarked allocations, including 
some power plants (ELLERMAN et al., 2007). 
 The method chosen for allocation allowances includes free allocating based on 
historical values and the auction. Thus, in the first period of the EU ETS (2005-2007), 
were allocated 95% of allowances by free of charge and auctioned the remaining 5%, in 
the second phase (2008-2012), 90% of allowances were free allocated and the remaining 
auctioned. With regard to the amount that each individual Member State must reduce its 
total emissions ET directive does not provide any information. Even about the goal that all 
member states should seek to achieve there is no mention. In fact, when the policy was 
drafted, existing information was still very low, especially with respect to which facilities 
would be covered by the scheme and its potential to reduce emissions (LEFEVERE, 2005). 
But the overall goal of reducing emissions of greenhouse gases has already been set in the 
Kyoto Protocol by 8% for the EU as a whole. Later the EU Burden-sharing Agreement 
distributed this aim among the various member states, setting a reduction target for each of 
them in percentage of 1990 emissions (for Portugal +27 and for Spain +15)(MULLINS, 
2005). 
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IV. MIBEL 
Due to increasing liberalization and high degree of complementarily between the 
electrical systems of Portugal and Spain, the actors in the electricity sector in both 
countries felt the need to create an organized market that allowed the short-term 
transactions and therefore minimize the associated costs (SILVA, 2007). Since electricity 
is a homogeneous good, standardized contracts can be traded, therefore soon the main 
conditions for the creation of the Iberian Electricity Market were filled. 
The idea begins to take shape in 1998, in which Portugal and Spain began studies and 
talks with the goal of gradually eliminating obstacles. However, due to great hesitation that 
characterized the start of MIBEL, MIBEL only became operational in June 2007. 
4.1 Characterization of Iberian Electricity Market 
 In this sub-section we present some statistics for the two countries, Portugal and 
Spain. These data will allow us to know a little better the Iberian market and have an idea 
about the final results of our study. Indeed as we saw before, BONACINA et al. (2007) 
report that the CO2 cost pass-through depends of the factors such as the degree of market 
concentration, the electricity generation mix, the price of allowances and the available 
capacity in the market. Statistics are presented together for Spain and Portugal, so that we 
can make a comparison between the two countries. 
 
4.1.1 Generation mix  
 The electricity generation mix influences the CO2 cost pass-through, according to 
their greater or lesser content of fossil fuels. Indeed, how much higher is the use of fossil 
fuels, especially those rich in carbon such as coal, more higher will be the CO2 cost pass-
through. 
 In Graph 1 we shows respectively the production mix of Portugal (PT) and Spain 
(SP). As we can see, in both countries, much of the electricity was produced, using carbon 
free sources. In Spain this portion equals about 64.74%, and Portugal at about 65.46%. 
This means that more than half of generated electricity is produced without CO2 emissions. 
So we can expect a smaller impact of the price of CO2 allowances in the electricity price. 
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 As regard the use of fossil fuels, the most used are gas and coal. In Portugal coal 
has more impact on the production mix than in Spain, accounting for 13.08% of production 
while in Spain represents only 8.74% of production. Thus we can expect that the CO2 cost 
pass through is slightly smaller in Spain. Regarding the use of natural gas, is Spain which 
has higher share of use of 23.27% while Portugal is 21.36%. 
 
Figure 2 - Electricity generation mix in Portugal and Spain
2
. Data of 2010. 
 
 
Sources: REN, Technical data 2010; CNE, Spanish Regulator’s Report to the European Commission 2011 
 
 
4.1.2 Degree of Market Concentration 
 The degree of market concentration has a positive impact on the CO2 cost pass-
through. Indeed, how much more concentrated is the market, more the firms with the 
largest market share are able to fix the prices. Thus, it becomes easier to include the price 
of CO2 allowances in the electricity price. 
 Table 1 shows the production market shares, for the largest firms that compete in 
each market. In Portugal, the degree of market concentration is higher, with EDP to 
                                                           
2 By Special Regime means all renewable. 
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produce more than half of the total energy produced in the country. The Spanish market is 
less concentrated, with the two main firms, Endesa and Iberdrola, presenting market shares 
of 24.3% and 19.6% of total production, respectively. According to this data, it is then 
likely that the CO2 cost pass-through is higher in Portugal than in Spain. 
 
Table 1 - Market share in production verified in Portugal and Spain. Data of 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* approximated values 
 
Sources: ERSE, Annual Report to the European Commission 2011; CNE, Spanish Regulator’s Report to the  
European Commission 2011 
 
 
4.1.3 Available Capacity in the Market 
 The installed capacity has a negative impact on CO2 cost pass-through. In fact how 
much greater is the capacity, more electricity can be produced by renewable or less carbon 
intensive fuels and therefore lower will be the impact of CO2 allowances in the electricity 
price. 
 Table 2 shows the installed capacity in Portugal and Spain. Spain has more 
installed capacity, which would be  expected since it is a country larger in size compared to 
Portugal. Thus, we may have more CO2 cost pass-through in Portugal than in Spain. 
 As regards the relative dimensions of each source, the production capacity is more 
higher for special regime followed by hydropower, both being renewable. Within the fossil 
fuels who have more installed capacity is natural gas, presenting 25.235MW and 3829MW 
in Spain and Portugal, respectively. 
 
Table 2 - Available capacity in Portugal and Spain. Data of 2010. 
Technology\Generation capacity (MW) Spain Portugal 
Fuel+Gas (conventional) 2.860 1657 
Coal 11.380 1756 
Production - Market Share Portugal Spain 
EDP 54.3%*  
REN Trading 13.9%*  
Endesa 1.3%* 19.6% 
Iberdrola 0.9%* 24.3% 
Others 29.6%*  
Gas Natural Fenosa  15% 
EDP-Hidrocantabrio  5.3% 
E.ON  3.5% 
Others (Ordinary Regime)  4.5% 
Others(Special Regime)  25.9% 
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Nuclear 7.777  
Diesel  165 
Natural Gas 25.235 3829 
Hydraulic 17.561 4578 
Special Regime 34.230 5935 
TOTAL 99.043 17920 
 
Sources: REN, Technical data 2010; CNE, Spanish Regulator’s Report to the European Commission 2011 
 
4.2 Functioning of spot market (daily and intraday market) 
The structural organization of the market comprises a vertical chain of activities 
that can be characterized in three fundamental points: energy production, transport and 
distribution, and finally supply. The activities of transport and distribution of electricity are 
based on the energy network leading from the place where it is produced to the point where 
it is consumed, requiring large initial investments. Therefore, from the economic point of 
view is more efficient to keep the monopolistic structure in such activities. Natural 
monopolies inherent in such activities are regulated, and there is a principle of free access 
by third parties with the payment of regulated tariffs. Recently, aiming at increasing 
integration and liberalization of the Portuguese and Spanish power market, it was 
published in Portugal the Decree-Law 75/2012, which proposes the abolition of regulated 
tariffs for all customers by early 2013. Thus more power companies can compete in the 
supply even if they do not have distribution networks, and it may lead to reduction on the 
price of electricity. 
  
4.2.1 Daily market 
In operation since the 1st January 1998, for the Spanish system,  and since the 1st 
July 2007, for the Portuguese system, the daily market is a platform that allows trade of 
electricity in order to be delivered on the next day. The functioning of this market stems 
from the cross between the bids and offers for sale, conducted by the various agents
3
 on the 
market. Each offering referred to the day and time that corresponds, as well as the price 
and amount of energy required. Buyers in this market are usually distributors, qualified 
consumers, suppliers and external agents with authorization. Traders are in the market to 
sell energy to qualified consumers, or in the case of the last resort traders, they may also 
                                                           
3 For market agents we mean the individuals or entities involved in economic transactions that take place in 
electricity market. 
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use the market to buy the electricity to meet consumer demand. In turn direct consumers 
purchase electricity directly in the organized market, through a retailer. 
 Is fixed one price for each hour of the day and every day of the year. 
 
Supply curve of daily market 
The supply curve for electricity in the daily market, for each hour of the day are of 
the various offers made by sales agents sorted in ascending price. In the lower part of the 
curve usually are the offers made by nuclear power plants and special regime (in the case 
of Spain) since the opportunity cost of these technologies is very low. In Portugal, in turn, 
the special regime does not participate in the production market (CRM, 2009). However, 
special regime production is purchased by the traders of last resort, and this electricity is 
integrated into its takeover bids. In the same area of the supply curve is also usually a price 
taker offer of sellers in the first eight CESUR auctions
4
, corresponding to their obligations, 
and also the hydro plants of run-of-water
5
.  
In the intermediate zone of the supply curve lies usually the offer of the coal-fired 
power plants and natural gas combined cycle, following a certain order depending on their 
income and their fuel supply contracts.  
In the upper curve are usually the hydro plants with reservoir of water, because 
their opportunity cost is dependent on the expectation of future price or depending the 
technology that it replaces. Finally, in the highest part of the curve, there are the fuel 
thermal power plants. For Portugal the fuel thermal plants are very important, bridging the 
limited reserves of hydro power, in extreme times of the year.  
The daily market include also open positions in the futures market conducted by the 
OMIP, the actions of emissions of primary energy, in the extent to which recur to the daily 
market to buy or sell energy compromised in certain auctions, and finally the distribution 
auctions by producers who come to the market daily to buy power for so they can ensure 
compliance with the derivative contracts of certain auctions. 
  
                                                           
4 The CESUR auctions are auctions of Iberian context, which sets physical bilateral contracts for the 
purchase or sale of energy between agents. In these contracts buyers are required to acquire the indicated 
amounts of energy in specific orders issued by authorities of respective countries. The electricity purchased at 
CESUR auctions is delivered in the Spanish zone of the Iberian Market (EDP, 2009). 
5 As it has no capacity to store water to other times. 
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Figure 3 - Supply curve of daily market 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Demand curve of daily market 
The demand curve is constituted by the set of offers to purchase electricity, sorted 
in descending order of price. Thus, in the highest part of this curve, there is demand on the 
regulated supply, using the instrument price (180,03€/MWh)6, at the middle and lower, are 
generally hydro plants with the pumping system and the traders who buy electricity to sell 
on the open market. 
The physical deliveries of electricity to come from procurement of energy in OMIP 
are considered as simple offers purchase at instrumental price (CRM, 2009).  
In the first eight auctions CESUR, sellers are required to launch a purchase bid, 
corresponding to their commitments in the same auctions. The price on the bid should 
equal the instrumental price in the daily market. In the first five virtual capacity auctions, 
participants can also use the daily market to meet its commitments. 
 
  
                                                           
6 For instrument price we means the maximum price at which whether make offers to purchase on the daily 
market. 
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Market price and market separation 
 The purchase and sale offers matching is conducted by the market operator through 
the process of simple or complex matching as they have been made simple or complex
7
 
offers. The simple matching method is a method to determine in isolation the marginal 
price, and the accepted amount of electricity in each unit of production or acquisition for 
each time period. In turn, the complex matching method determines the outcome of the 
matching from the simple matching method, which is added the indivisibility and graduate 
load conditions, resulting in the simple conditional matching. The various simple 
conditional matching are carried out through repeated processes until the units of matching 
offers satisfy the complex conditions stated. The result is the first provisional final 
solution. Later, the first final solution is reach also through an iterative process considering 
the maximum capacity of international interconnection including the offers made in the 
daily market, and the executions of physical bilateral contracts with affectation to express 
external interconnections to the Iberian market. 
As the result, the market operator reaches the outcome of the matching, which is 
given by the schedule entry defined by the network operator through offers of cooperation 
in which on gets the amount of electricity to ensure which production satisfy the demand in 
each time period of the same day. 
 Graphically as we can see on figure 4, the market price is determined by the 
intersection of the supply curve (dashed dark gray curve) and the demand curve (black 
curve), for the same hour. The equilibrium price corresponds to the lowest price that 
ensures that supply meets demand. When the complex conditions are present in unit sales 
some units are removed from the encounter process, causing a displacement of the 
equilibrium final price for the crossing the light gray line and the black line. The 
functioning of this market is organized so that all buyers pay the same price and all sellers 
receive the same value, (model of marginal price). 
  
                                                           
7 Complex offers including complex conditions as: Indivisibility, Load Gradients, Minimum income, and 
Schedule stop (for more information see http://www.omie.es/en/home/markets-and-products/electricity-
market/daily-and-intradaily/daily-market/daily-market). 
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Figure 4 – Aggregate supply and demand in the daily market of MIBEL, 26/04/12, 16:00h 
 
 
Source: OMIE 
 
Since the daily market includes both Iberian countries it is important to determine 
in which situations the interconnection capabilities available between them, is enough to 
allow to support cross-border flows of energy required and determined in the market.  
Where this happens, if the interconnection capacity is not enough, described above 
is repeated, separating the two geographic areas and obtaining a market price specific to 
each one. This mechanism is called market splitting (see figure 5). 
When the prices for the two parts of the market are not the same it is said that there 
is a “spread price” between them. The separation of markets, and corresponding spreads 
prices are likely to be caused by a variety of factors. These include the structural 
organization of production in each area, the lack of interconnection capacity or the 
behaviour of agents. The supervision acts to minimize the situations of separation of the 
market, in particular preventing them to lead to anti-competitive behaviour of the agents. 
 The price determined for each hour of each session on the daily market is equal to 
the price of the final set of sell offer on last unit of production whose acceptance is 
necessary to meet the demand. In this case there is no separation of the markets. However 
when there is separation of markets, the price of the exporting country will be equal to the 
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price of the last offer, held within its borders, and the price of the importing country will be 
equal to the maximum price from the ones set in the two meetings of offers corresponding 
to both countries. 
Figure 5 – Daily market hourly price, MIBEL, 26/04/12 
 
Market Splitting Integrated Market 
SP Price and PT Price  Single Price (SP and PT) 
 
 
Source: OMIE 
 
The daily market closes at 10 hours of the previous day of the date of delivery and 
the outcome of the matching are published one hour later. The matching process involves: 
the transfer of open positions of the daily market, where physical delivery is requested; the 
information on the execution of regulated auctions, whenever it arises by physical delivery, 
and also the results of the capacity auctions on interconnections.  
 
4.2.2 Intraday market 
The intraday market is a platform that complements the daily market, where is 
traded the electricity to adjust the quantities traded in the daily market, through the 
submission of offers for sale and purchase electricity. The intraday market includes six 
daily sessions of trading, each of them leads to a price for each of the hours on trading. As 
the daily market, the intraday market also includes all hours of the day and every day of the 
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year, and runs through the intersection of offers to purchase and sale of electricity, 
conducted by various agents able to transact in the daily market. 
 
Supply curve 
The supply curve includes sell offers of electricity held by two type of agents. 
Firstly, agents able to submit in the daily market and who have participated in the session 
of the respective daily market or have performed a bilateral contract or who did not 
participate because a temporary unavailability. Secondly agents, who able to submit the 
purchase bids in the daily market, have participated in the respective session of the daily 
market, from which opens the session of the intraday market, or run a physical bilateral 
contract. These agents are only allowed to participate in sessions of the intraday market for 
the time frame corresponding to the programming included in the daily market sessions.  
The final program resulting from the complete acceptance of the offer plus the 
previous program of the unit of production or acquisition must fulfill the restrictions 
declared by the operator of the system for the time of the programming, or if do not meet 
before the deal be completed, it is very close to their fulfillment. 
 
Demand Curve 
The demand curve aggregates the purchase bids of electricity made by all agents 
able to submit in the daily market and also for all agents able to present purchase offers in 
the daily market, they participated in the session on the daily market on which was open to 
intraday market session or have performed a physical bilateral contract. Holders of 
purchase bids in the daily market can only participate in the program schedules included in 
the intraday market sessions corresponding to those included in the intraday market session 
in which they will participate. 
Again, the final program obtained the complete acceptance of the offer plus the 
previous program, the production unit must comply with the restrictions laid down by the 
operator of the system for the scheduling horizon, or in fail to comply case, be near to 
fulfill them. So the purchase bids in each intraday market sessions shall be such as to 
enable compliance with this programs. 
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Market price 
The process is the same of the daily market until determine the first provisional 
final solution. Subsequently, also through an iterative process attains the final and binding 
first solution that takes into account the maximum international interconnection capacity. 
 In both matching methods, its ensure that any offer that not comply with the 
restrictions imposed by the operator of the system or cannot meet these restrictions (still 
that the matching offers allow him to approaching the fulfillment) will be matching, for 
safety. 
 The price determined for each hour of each session of the intraday market is equal 
to the price of last block of the sell offer of the last production unit whose acceptance is 
necessary to meet some or all purchase offers at equal or higher price than the marginal 
price. 
 
4.3 CO2 Allowances  
 Here we will give an overview of the trading of allowances. We present the foreign 
and domestic trade of allowances recorded in Spain and in Portugal, and we provide the 
legislation for the post-2012 period. 
 As we can observe (on table 3) Spain is the country that purchases more allowances 
to and from foreign countries, presenting average values around 54 million for exports and 
44 million for imports. The two main buyers and seller countries are Great Britain and 
France (see appendix C). In turn Portugal export and import fewer allowances with foreign 
countries, however the imported allowances is in the average 12 million and the exported 
allowances is in the average 16 millions. The three countries with more trading 
relationships with Portugal are France, Spain and Denmark. In general both countries 
export more allowances than they import. 
Table 3- Foreign trade of emission allowances. 
Foreign Trade 2008 2009 2010 
Portugal 
   
import 3.503.501 28.019.395 6.349.425 
export 7.917.857 27.039.815 13.067.978 
Spain 
   
import 22.964.972 67.678.802 42.142.441 
export 32.794.766 69.848.446 60.603.307 
 Source: United Nations, Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
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 For the domestic trade, considering  only the transactions carried out by electricity 
generators. For this purpose we collect data on the number of allowances allocated to each 
power plant and the ones used by each power plant. The difference between the two values 
is the number of CO2 allowances purchased or sold by each generator. These results 
aggregation are tables 4 and 5. In Portugal (table 4) we can see  that the number of 
allowances purchased exceeds the value of sold allowances, being the sales are in average 
600.000 and the purchases are in average 24 million. 
 
Table 4- Electricity market transactions of CO2 allowances in Portugal. 
Source: Own calculations; European Commission, Climate Action8  
 
 In Spain (table 5) the situation is the same, the number of allowances purchased 
exceeds the number of allowances sold, and the purchases are in average 150 million while 
the sales are in average 5 millions. 
 
 
Table 5- Electricity market transactions of CO2 allowances in Spain. 
Allowances 
SP 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Purchased 33.596.078 149.746.021 272.726.477 31.465.753 110.353.870 174.119.730 252.588.794 
Sold 14.807.751 9.760.335 8.337.286 6.576.700 1.050.943 179.453 163.142 
Source: Own calculations; European Commission, Climate Action9 
 
 Regarding CO2 allowances, for the post-2012 period, CRM (2009) says that: 
“The solution found in the scope of MIBEL for treatment of allowances 
of carbon dioxide linked to the production of electricity should be in line 
with the new Directive 2009/29/EC (…). The same happens with legal 
regime applicable to the ongoing period (2008-2012), i.e., any solution to 
                                                           
8 ,8available in 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/allocationComplianceMgt.do;EUROPA_JSESSIONID=VKW4QJFKbG
MW798LjGv5GWFrtPVCMPTrg6yk123RQngstlzGXnns!-405364425?languageCode=en 
 
 
Allowances 
PT 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Purchased 1.536.301 22.372.179 41.728.836 2.930.969 20.278.136 33.082.163 46.834.785 
Sold 849.934 0 0 1.446.863 711.586 630.932 619.452 
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the MIBEL in this period must be in accordance with national laws, but 
also with the European Directive, being important to remember that 
national allocation plants were approved by the European Commission.” 
 One of the most important aspects of the directive 2009/29/EC is the exclusion of 
the electric sector of the free allocation of allowances in the post-2012 period. Therefore, 
the CO2 allowances should be acquired in full by auction. This decision is based on the 
ability of the electric sector has to include the cost of allowances in electricity price 
without loss of competitiveness against possible competitors from outside (19º considering 
policy 2009/29/EC). Only on very strict conditions (not applicable to MIBEL) is that it will 
allow the gradual introduction of auctions from a free allocation system (Article 10º - C  
Directive 2009/29/EC). 
 The directive further provides that at least 50% of revenues from sales of CO2 
emission allowances by auction should be used to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. 
These reductions  will be achieved through the development of renewable, measures to 
avoid deforestation and increase forestation, capture and geological storage of CO2 in a 
safe environment, funding equity research and developments in the fields of energy 
efficiency and clean technologies (article 10º, point 3). 
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V. Methodology, data and results  
 
 Own aim is to estimate the impact of the price of CO2 allowances in the price of 
electricity. For this we estimate a vector autoregressive model (VAR). In fact, taking in to 
account the empirical studies analyzed, the VAR methodology was that seemed most 
appropriate. The VAR (SIMS, 1980) includes as explanatory variables one or more lags of 
dependent variable. These models are often used because provide better estimates than 
other more complex models, considers all variables as endogenous and allows simple 
estimation OLS generating consistent estimators (GUJARATI, 2003).  
 As a starting point we take the model and assumptions made by SIJM et al. 
(2006a). However, instead of using forward prices, we use spot prices, as FELL (2010) and 
SOLIER et al. (2011). This decision was made due to the unavailability of data on the 
future price of electricity, segregated by country and load periods, and mainly because we 
want to assess the impact of CO2 in the current price of electricity. 
 We do not consider that the price of fuel used to produce electricity is fully 
included in the price of electricity. In fact SIJM et al. (2006a), justify the use of this 
assumption by the high correlation between the price of fuel and the price of CO2 
allowances. This does not seems to happen in our case. This hypothesis was even discarded 
in SIJM et al. (2006b). 
 According SIJM et al. (2006a) we assume that all costs other than those taken with 
fuel and CO2 allowances are constant and the market structure does not change. The use of 
these assumptions is justified by the lack of data. 
 The basic equation used is the relationship between the price of electricity at time t 
and at time t-1, the cost of fuel, the cost of CO2 allowances and the temperature.  
 
    
                       
                  
          
                 
     (1) 
  
 Where              represents the spot electricity price,      is the spot price of CO2 
allowances,       is the spot price of fuel used in power generation,   represents the 
temperature, and      is the error term.  The underscripts l and t represents the load duration 
period (base load and peak load) and the time of the observation, respectively. The 
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overscripts o and c represent the marginal technology used during the considering load 
period (oil and coal respectively). 
 We introduce two additional variables to the initial model of SIJM et al. (2006a), 
the temperature and the price of electricity at time t-1, the variables are used by 
AHAMADA et al. (2012), referred as crucial in determining the day-ahead price of 
electricity. Considering the fact that the non-linearity of the relationship between the 
demand for electricity and the temperature, we use as the authors mentioned above, the 
temperature (T) and its square (T
2
). Indeed, ENGLE et al. (1986) determine that the 
relationship between electricity demand and the temperature is V-shaped, i. e. The demand 
for electricity is higher during periods were the temperature are extreme. 
 We define a single marginal technology for each country and load period, as SIJM 
et al. (2008). For Spain, we consider that the price of electricity in base load is set by coal, 
while in peak load is determined by oil, following SOLIER et al. (2011). For Portugal, 
given that at the best of our knowledge, there are no studies about these information. We 
decided to set coal for the base load price, since it is one of the most used fuels in power 
generation, and oil for peak load. This assumption is justified by BONACINA et al. (2007) 
that argue that gas and coal are not peak technologies. 
 The period of our analysis starts on February 26
th
 of 2008 and end on December 
31st of 2011, thus covering only the second phase of the EU ETS. The reason for this 
choice lies in the lack of more recent data and the break in the price of CO2 allowances 
price in the end of 2007. 
 The sample data were collected from several sources, as we can see in the 
following table. 
Table 6 - Sumary of variables 
Variable Description Source Unit 
Price of electricity 
Electricity spot price 
segregated by load: base 
and peak load 
Iberian market Operator – 
Portuguese polo (OMIP) 
€/MWh 
Temperature 
Average temperature of the 
day 
Weather Forecasts & Reports, 
Wunderground 
ºC 
Price of CO2 
allowances 
CO2 allowances spot price Bluenext €/ton 
Price of coal Coal spot price Standard API 2 for the USD/ton 
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Variable Description Source Unit 
delivered area ARA 
(Antwerp, Rotterdam, and 
Amsterdam) 
Price of oil Oil spot price 
U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) 
USD/Barrel 
Source: developed with data 
 
 The price of CO2 is converted in €/MWh using the standard emission factors 
provided by the Covenant of Mayors. To convert the prices of coal and oil we use the 
€/USD exchange rate available in Bank of Portugal and later we used the following 
methodology: 
 
                                                            
 
(2) 
 The rate of efficiency and heat rate for each fuel are show in the following table: 
 
Table 7 - Rate of efficiency and heat rate for each fuel 
  Heat Rate Efficiency Rate 
Coal Kcal/Kg 5500 0.33 
Oil Kcal/Kg 9400 0.33 
Sources: AIE,CNE 
 
 Before estimating the level of CO2 cost pass-through itself, we analyzed the 
behaviour of the variables analysing charts, calculating the descriptive statistics, the 
correlation between the variables and using the unit root tests to examine the stationarity of 
the series. 
 From the graphic analysis (see figure 6,7,8 and 9 in appendix B) of the variation in 
the price of electricity and the price of CO2 allowances, we find that sometimes the series 
fluctuate independently or even in opposite directions. This occurs primarily in the months 
of February 2008 through mid-June of that year and February 2011 to December 2011. 
Therefore the price of electricity seems to be more influenced by the price of fuel used than 
by the price of the CO2 allowances. 
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 When comparing the variations in the price of electricity with fuel prices, we find 
that for both countries the coal seems to be the marginal technology in base load, since its 
behaviour is identical to the electricity price. 
 Descriptive statistics and expected signals of the variables are show in table 8. As 
we can see, electricity prices are higher during peak load than during base load, and prices 
in Spain are close to those of Portugal, although slightly lower. The price of allowances is 
on average 5,698€/MWh, which reflects the low prices in beginning of year 2008.   
 
Table 8 - Descriptive statistics and expected signal of variables 
Variable Mean Stand. 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Expected 
signal 
             
          
 48,831 14,615 7,720 83,730  
             
          
 52,022 14,926 8,970 90,880  
              
          
 46,993 12,900 4,620 79,650  
              
          
 50,864 13,814 3,470 86,430  
    5,698 1,646 2,387 10,601 + 
      36,131 10,620 20,171 67,438 + 
     125,620 32,593 48,101 182,932 + 
    18,080 5,130 4 32 - 
    15,116 7,505 -2 30 + 
   
  353,193 188,905 16 1034 - 
   
  284,754 235,936 0 900 + 
Source: developed with data 
  
 To complement the analysis of variables, we present also the study of the 
correlation between the different variables used. The correlation matrix is presented in 
table 15 in appendix B. The correlation between CO2 and electricity prices is between 
0.540 and 0.592, being the lowest value observed in Spain for peak load and the highest 
value recorded in Portugal for the base load. Although the correlation values are very close 
there seems to be a stronger correlation between CO2 electricity prices in Portugal than in 
Spain. 
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 Concerns to the correlation between the prices of CO2 allowances and prices of 
coal and oil, we found a weak correlation between the oil price and CO2 price (on the order 
of 0.289) while in the case of the coal price and CO2 price the correlation is stronger, 
although the variables do not seem to be highly correlated in 0.630. 
 To test the existence of unit roots we used the Dikey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron 
tests. The results of both tests (see table 13 in appendix B) conclude that the variables 
corresponding to the price of coal, oil and CO2 allowances, include unit roots, being 
integrated of order 1. Meanwhile the prices of electricity and temperature are stationary 
variables. 
 The unit root tests mentioned above, considers only the behaviour of an individual 
series, forgetting the possible mutual influences that the trajectories of different series can 
exert on each other. The study of this influences provides the existence of a long-term 
equilibrium between them, a concept developed by ENGLE et al. (1987).  
 Two or more series are said to be cointegrated when analyzed separately follow a 
non-stationary process, i.e. they are integrated of order 1 or I(1), but if they are considered 
together become stationary, i. e. I(0) (GREENE, 2003). This means that there is a linear 
combination between them that results in a stationary series or I(0).  
 To verify the existence of cointegration relationships among the variables, we use 
the Johansen test, that has been widely used in empirical studies. The results obtained are 
shown in the table 14 of appendix B. We note then that the variables included in the 
models 1 and 2 (see table 9) show three cointegration relationships while the variables 
included in the models 3 and 4 present two cointegration relationships. Therefore, we can 
say that the variables used in our model are cointegrated, and we do not need to 
differentiate the non-stationary series. 
  
Table 9 -Variables  in each model 
Model 1 Base Load PT, CO2, Coal, TPT, TPT
2 
Model 2 Peak Load PT, CO2, Oil, TPT, TPT
2 
Model 3 Base Load SP, CO2, Coal, TSP, TSP
2 
Model 4 Peak Load SP, CO2, Oil, TSP, TSP
2 
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 Now, we estimate equation 1, to assess the impact of CO2 emission allowances in 
the electricity price. This impact is usually called CO2 cost pass-through. Due to non-
significance of the variable CO2 at time t in model 3, we introduce the one lag of the 
variable, to see if this was significant, and thus determine whether the CO2 price is 
included in the price of electricity. 
 After estimating the equations, we perform the LM test for autocorrelation in VAR, 
and we conclude for the presence of autocorrelation. According to GUJARATI (2003) the 
solution is to apply the Newey-west matrix, which corrects the standard deviations for both 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The results obtained are shown in the table 10. 
 
Table 10- Newey-west estimation results 
Note: Standard errors are in ( ); *,**,*** refer respectively to the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels. 
  
 Overall all the variables included in the various models are significant, excluding 
only the price of CO2 allowances at time t, the temperature and the squared temperature at 
base load, for Spain. 
 
Portugal Spain 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
             
          
              
          
               
          
               
          
 
      
          
 
0,921*** 
(0,019) 
0,927*** 
(0,021) 
0,882*** 
(0,026) 
0,916*** 
(0,019) 
    
    
0,189** 
(0,094) 
0,381*** 
(0,110) 
-0,283 
(0,210) 
0,376*** 
(0,110) 
       
    
 
 
 
0,500** 
(0,227) 
 
  
     
0,067*** 
(0,022) 
 
0,087*** 
(0,027) 
 
  
     
0,010** 
(0,004) 
 
0,013*** 
(0,005) 
  
-0,280** 
(0,125) 
-0,409** 
(0,163) 
-0,097 
(0,071) 
-0,223** 
(0,088) 
   
0,008** 
(0,003) 
0,011*** 
(0,004) 
0,003 
(0,002) 
0,007*** 
(0,003) 
  
2,563** 
(1,149) 
3,724** 
(1,523) 
1,548*** 
(0,643) 
1,839** 
(0,833) 
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 Doing the analysis of each variable separately, we found that the variable that most 
influences the price of electricity is the electricity price at time t-1. The variable coefficient 
is approximately 1, which shows that the current price is very close to the price recorded in 
the previous day. 
 The price of coal and crude oil also significantly influence the price of electricity. 
Although they set the price of electricity at different load times, coal appears to have a 
greater impact on electricity prices than the price of oil in both countries. In fact, it is 
estimated that an increase of 1€/MWh in the price of coal causes an increase of 0,067 and 
0,087€/MWh in electricity prices of base load in Portugal and Spain respectively, ceteris 
paribus. In turn, an increase of 1€/MWh in the price of oil causes an estimated increase of 
0,01 and 0,013€/MWh, in the price of electricity in peak load, respectively in Portugal and 
Spain, ceteris paribus. 
 Temperature affects negatively the price of electricity, which can be justified by the 
non-linearity of their relationship with the electricity price, as previously stated. The square 
of the temperature, seems to have less impact on electricity prices, with values in the range 
of 0,003 at 0,011€/MWh for each increase of one degree Celsius in temperature squared, 
ceteris paribus. However the impact is positive, showing that an increase in temperature 
causes an increase in the price of electricity. 
 Finally, we will focus on the most important variable in our study, the price of CO2 
allowances. This variable, at time t, is not significant in base load for Spain, being only 
significant at time t-20 (20 days). In Portugal, the price of CO2 allowances at time t is 
significant for both load periods. However, we also found that unlike for Spain, in 
Portugal, the impact of the price of CO2 allowances in the electricity price is greater in 
peak load than in base load. These two results suggest that the price of electricity in peak 
load is influenced by the price of CO2 allowances at time t, while in base load is influenced 
by the price of allowances recorded in previous time periods. 
 The distinction between peak load and base load, is that in peak load power plants 
produce to meet verified demand, which can be greater that the amount they plan to 
produce to meet demand. So these periods producers can be forced to produce more that 
they expected, thus may be they need to purchase or use more allowances received free of 
charge, to cover the amount of their emissions. In base load the amount of electricity 
produced is in most cases equal to the expected quantity. Thus the amount of CO2 
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allowances required to cover emissions may have been secured well in advance, with the 
acquisition or affectation of allowances made in the days before the generation. 
 We found that an increase of 1€/MWh in the price of CO2 allowances, causes an 
estimated increase of 0,189€/MWh for base load electricity price, in Portugal. This value 
of CO2 cost pass-through can be explained by increasing investment, over the past few 
years, in Portugal, in the production of electricity through renewable sources, free of 
emissions of greenhouse gases. For the same period in Spain we have load of 0,5€/MWh in 
electricity price.  
 In peak load is estimated that an increase of 1€/MWh in the price of CO2 
allowances in t, leading to an increase of 0,381 and 0,376€/MWh in electricity prices in 
Portugal and Spain respectively. In fact, this result is between the result of SOLIER et al. 
(2011), 0,21€/MWh, and the result of SIJM et al. (2008), 0,52€/MWh, for CO2 cost pass-
through during peak load in Spain. The result obtained for Portugal is also in accordance 
with the result of FREITAS et al. (2012), that determine that the CO2 cost pass-through in 
Portugal is between 33-51%. 
 According to the results obtained there is effectively CO2 cost pass-through in 
MIBEL. Thus, after 2012 these values may become more relevant, and therefore may 
increase the price of electricity. In this case, the consumers would pay the cost of CO2, 
which could make them the biggest losers of the emissions trading scheme. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
 The process of creating the EU ETS began to take its first steps in 1998. Before this 
date, the major institutions and Member States were skeptical to the idea of trade 
emissions. But the ratification of the Kyoto protocol and the change of staff in the 
European Commission determined the change in mentality. 
 The success in creating the EU emissions trading system, was mainly determined 
by the existence of a single market and the easy acceptance by the industry. But this 
process was also characterized by some difficulties as the decentralized approach with that 
as developed the EU ETS and the lack of historical data of allowances at existing firms. 
 The EU ETS was then created in December of 2002, and determined the free 
allocation of CO2 allowances to the main emitting sectors, reserving a small portion of 
allowances that would be auctioned. Emissions trading has established itself as a flexibility 
mechanism that allow the trade of CO2 emission allowances. The trade proved to be very 
significant. 
 Thus, the EU ETS imposed a cost on CO2 emission, blaming the emitters for the 
pollution caused, and encouraging the reduction of emissions. In fact, the price of 
allowances represents an opportunity cost to affected firms. 
 Particularly in the electric sector this issue has triggered public attention due to the 
possibility to include this opportunity cost in the price of electricity, generating additional 
profits for the power plants. Thus the main objective of this dissertation was to evaluate the 
existence of this CO2 cost pass-through in the newly created Iberian Electricity market. For 
this analysis we use the vector autoregressive model (VAR). 
 From our analysis, we conclude that there is evidence of the CO2 cost pass-through 
to the price of electricity, which is slightly higher in Portugal than in Spain. The CO2 cost 
pass-through was estimated lies between 0,189 and 0,381€/MWh for Portugal and between 
0,376 and 0,5€/MWh, for Spain. The CO2 cost pass-through seems to be greater in peak 
load than in base load. Another difference observed between peak and base load, is that the 
impact of CO2 in base load appears to be more slow, mainly in Spain. 
 Considering the end of the free allocation of allowances to the electricity sector, it 
may happen that these values become more relevant, and therefore the price of electricity 
can increase. This can be harmful to consumers because they would be forced to pay more 
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for electricity. Thus the consumers would pay the cost of CO2, which could make them the 
biggest losers of the emissions trading scheme.  
 
Limitations of the model and suggestions for future studies 
 Our model evaluates the impact of the CO2 allowances price in electricity price, but 
it has some limitations that give us ideas for the future studies. 
 The main limitation of our model relates to the assumptions we adopted for lack of 
data, particularly with regard to the costs of electricity production and changes in the 
market structure. Thus, we suggest, for one future study, including data on the costs of 
maintaining the power plants and the inclusion of a proxy variable for changes in the level 
of market structure. 
 Finally, we suggest further extending the study to the year 2012, to include the 
entire period of the second phase of the EU ETS.  
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Appendix A 
 
Table 11 -Theoretical Studies 
Study Hypothesis Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
SIJM (2004) 
- The price of CO2 
allowances is fully 
included in the price of 
electricity 
-The price of electricity is 
determined by the 
marginal production costs 
-Electricity Prices 
-CO2 allowances price 
-Coal, Natural Gas and 
Oil prices 
-The increase in electricity 
prices derived from 
emissions trading is 
determined by the factor 
of marginal production. 
Data: for Netherlands  
Methodology: 
simulation 
 
KARA et al. (2008)  -Electricity Prices 
-Capacity data 
- Demand for electricity 
-Hydropower input 
- Fuels price 
- Temperature  
-The annual average 
electricity price increase 
by 0.74€/MWh for every 
1€/ton CO2. 
Data: collected from 
historical statistics, and 
for the future it is 
based on scenario 
assumptions , for 
Finland 
Methodology: 
simulation 
 
BERIZZI et al. (2009)  -Electricity Prices -Carbon prices 
-The increase in electricity 
prices resulting from 
emissions trading is 
significantly higher in 
oligopoly than under 
perfect competition 
Data: for Italy 
Methodology: 
simulation 
 
WALS et al. (2003) -Elastic demand -Electricity Prices -Carbon prices 
-An increase in CO2 prices 
cause an increase in 
electricity prices for all 
countries; 
- In an oligopolistic 
market, an increase in 
marginal costs will not be 
fully integrated on 
Data: for France, 
Netherlands, Belgium, 
and Germany 
Methodology: 
simulation  
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Study Hypothesis Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
electricity prices, since the 
producers  will partly 
reduces their mark ups; 
-An increase in the CO2 
prices to 5€/ton represents 
a 10% decreases in the 
amount of CO2 emitted.  
RENESES et al. (2008) 
-Inelastic demand; 
-In the first phase, 
renewable generation is 
deterministic; 
-In the second phase of 
the EU ETS the water 
conditions as fixed and no 
free allowances have 
been considered. 
-Electricity Prices 
-Carbon prices 
-Fuel costs  
-Hydro conditions 
-Renewable generation 
-An increase of 5€/ton in 
the price of CO2 causes 
an increase of 3-
3.5€/MWh in the price of 
electricity in the first 
phase and 2.5-2.8€ in the 
second phase. 
Data: for Portugal and 
Spain 
Methodology: 
simulation 
SOUSA et al. (2005) -perfect competition -Electricity prices 
-Demand for Hydro and 
Special Regime 
Generation 
- Thermal residual 
demand 
- Marginal generation 
costs  
- Specific CO2 emissions 
- Installed capacity by 
technology 
-It can be expected an 
increase in electricity 
prices mainly when there 
is coal power generation, 
and during base load 
Data: for Portugal and 
Spain 
Methodology: 
simulation 
 
LINARES et al.(2006) 
-oligopolistic structure 
-endogenous allowances 
price 
-firms make their 
capacity-expansion 
decisions as in Nash-
Cournot Equilibrium 
-Electricity prices 
-Emission permit price 
-technologies considered: 
nuclear, fuel, natural gas, 
gas combined cycle, coal, 
hydro pumping units, and 
in future too biomass and 
wind 
-Electricity prices increase 
about 20% due to the 
trading of emission 
allowances 
Data: for Spain 
Methodology: 
simulation 
 
BONACINA et al.(2007) -Inelastic demand -Electricity price 
-variable costs 
-emission rates 
-allowances price 
-The CO2 cost pass-
through is 100% when 
electricity market is 
Data: for Italy 
Methodology: 
simulation 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
assumed to be perfectly 
competitive 
-Under market power, the 
CO2 cost pass trough can 
be lower or higher than 
that under competition 
depending of degree of 
market concentration, 
plant mix operated by 
either the dominant firm 
or the competitive fringe, 
the price of CO2 
allowances and available 
capacity 
-Under market power the 
EU ETS impact is higher 
than under perfect 
competition only when 
there is excess of capacity 
and the share of most 
polluting plants is low 
enough 
 
SIMSHAUSER et al. 
(2009) 
 -Electricity prices 
-Size, Capacity, 
Availability, Min. Load, 
Efficiency, Heat rate, 
Unit fuel, Fuel cost, 
Emissions for renewable, 
coal , natural gas and 
hydro 
-The pass-through rate of 
CO2 cost impost to 
electricity consumers is 
78% 
Data: for Victoria 
Methodology: 
simulation 
 
GENOESE et al. (2007) 
-Renewable electricity 
generation is set to zero 
-Electricity prices 
-Electricity demand 
-Renewable Electricity  
-power plants 
-emission allowances 
price 
-Approximately 75-100% 
of the CO2 allowance price 
is passed through to the 
electricity price 
Data: for Germany 
Methodology: 
simulation 
 
CHEN et al. (2008)  -Electricity prices 
-CO2 allowances price 
-Fuel prices 
-Estimate that the rate of 
CO2 marginal cost pass-
Data: for France, 
Germany, Belgium 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
through are between 60%-
100% for Netherlands and 
60%-80% in Germany 
Methodology: 
simulation 
CHERNYASVS’KA et 
al. (2008) 
-Inelastic demand 
-Power system consists of 
only two groups of plants, 
and each group includes a 
very large number of 
homogeneous generating 
units 
-Emissions abatement is 
impossible or abatement 
cost infinitely costly 
-firm’s offer prices are 
constrained to be below 
some threshold level  
-Electricity price 
-Available capacity 
-CO2 allowances price 
-Coal prices 
-Gas prices 
-Oil prices 
- The CO2 cost pass 
through depends of the 
available capacity 
-In the peak hours, the 
marginal pass-through rate 
is less than 1 under 
scarcity of generation 
capacity 
- In the off-peak hours, 
electricity prices fully 
include the marginal 
carbon opportunity cost, 
exist or not excess of 
capacity 
Data: for Italy in  
2005 and 2006 
Source(s):Italian 
Market Operator 
Methodology: 
simulation 
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Table 12- Empirical studies 
Study Hypothesis Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
FELL (2010)  -Electricity price 
- Coal  
- Natural gas  
- Reservoir water 
- CO2  
- Air temperature 
-Electricity prices have 
large short-term responses 
to CO2 price shocks 
-The response of 
electricity prices to 
changes in electricity 
prices is generally 
significant and it will be 
dilute over time 
- when the marginal 
production technology 
used is coal the transfer of 
costs is almost complete 
Data: for Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and 
Sweden  
Source(s):point 
carbon, 
University of Dayton’s 
average daily 
temperature Archive, 
Elspot, Zeebrugge hub, 
Swedish Environment  
Research InstituteIVL 
Methodology:  
Cointegrated Vector 
Autoregressive 
(CVAR) and  Vector 
error correction model 
(VECM) 
SIJM et al.(2006a) 
-all costs, excluding fuel 
or allowances, are 
constant 
-market structure does 
not change 
-the cost of the fuel is 
fully reflected in 
electricity prices 
-Electricity price 
- Coal prices 
- Natural gas prices  
- CO2 allowances price 
-Concluded that the rates 
of CO2 cost pass-through  
are between 60% and 
117% in Germany and 
between 64% and 81% in 
the Netherlands 
Data: for Germany 
and Netherlands in the 
year of 2005 
Source(s): European 
Energy Exchange 
(EEX) 
Methodology:  
OLS 
SIJM et al.(2006b) 
-all costs, excluding fuel 
or allowances, are 
constant 
-market structure does 
not change 
-Electricity price 
- Coal prices 
- Natural gas prices  
- CO2 allowances price 
-For the period January-
July 2005 CO2 pass 
through rates have been 
estimated to vary roughly 
between 40 and 70%. 
-During the period 
August-December the 
CO2 pass through rates up 
to 100% 
Data: for Germany 
and Netherlands in the 
year of 2005 
Source(s): European 
Energy Exchange 
(EEX) 
Methodology:  
OLS and Prais-
Winston 
SIJM et al. (2008) -all costs, excluding fuel -Electricity price - Coal prices -For all countries Data: for France, 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
or allowances, are 
constant 
-market structure does 
not change 
-the cost of the fuel is 
fully reflected in 
electricity prices 
- Natural gas prices  
- Oil prices  
- CO2 allowances price 
analyzed there are 
evidence of CO2 cost 
pass-through 
-In particular, for Spain 
the CO2 cost pass-through 
rate is 0.5 during peak 
load and 0.64 during base 
load, for 2005 
-In 2006, the CO2 cost 
pass-through rate is 1.11 
during peak load and 0.52 
during base load, for 
Spain 
Germany, Italy, 
Poland, Spain, 
Sweden, Czech 
Republic, Netherlands 
and United Kingdom 
in the years 2005 and 
2006 
Source(s): European 
Energy Exchange 
(EEX), ARA CIF 
API#2, Zeebrugge, 
Bunde, Title Transfer 
Facility, Nacional 
Balancing Point, Nord 
Pool and Point Carbon, 
OMEL  
Methodology:  
OLS 
SOLIER et al. (2011) 
-all costs, excluding fuel 
or allowances, are 
constant 
-market structure does 
not change 
-the cost of the fuel is 
fully reflected in 
electricity prices  
-Electricity price 
- Coal  
- Natural gas  
- Oil 
- CO2  
-The CO2 cost pass-through 
is more relevant in the first 
phase of the EU ETS 
-There is no evidence of 
cost pass-through in 2009 
for all countries 
 
Data: from June 2005 
to April 2011 and for 
Germany, France, 
Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, Italia, Spain, 
Nord Pool System 
Price, Poland, Czech 
Republic and Austria 
Source(s): 
Intercontinental 
exchange, Standad 
API2 for the delivered 
area ARA (Antwerp, 
Rotterdam, and 
Amsterdam), Nacional 
Balancing Point, 
Zeebrugge hub, Title 
Transfer Facility hub, 
Bluenext 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
Methodology:  
OLS 
AHAMADA et al. (2012) 
-Changes in electricity 
prices reflect changes in 
the marginal cost of 
electricity-generation 
-Electricity price 
- Coal  
- Natural gas  
- CO2  
- Temperature 
- Electricity price at time t-
1 
-Before October, 2008 the 
impact of carbon prices is 
not significant in both 
countries´ 
-After October 2008 
carbon prices strongly 
influences the electricity 
price 
-An increase in the 
allowances price of 1% 
results in 0.19% to 0.21% 
and 0.13% to 0.14% 
higher electricity prices  
in France and Germany, 
respectively.  
Data:  from Germany 
and France for the 
period between  March 
3rd, 2008 until  
December 30th, 2010 
Source(s):EPX spot 
Exange, Bluenext, 
Zeebrugge hub, Coal 
CIF ARA, European 
Climate Assessment 
and Dataset 
Methodology:  
ARCH and GARCH 
models 
KEPPLER (2010)  -Electricity price 
-CO2 allowances price 
-Calendar 
-Gas price 
 
-There is a causality 
relationship between 
forward prices of CO2 
allowances and forward 
prices of electricity  
Data: 2005 to 2007, in 
Europe 
Source(s): BlueNext 
and EEX 
Methodology: 
Granger Causality tests 
KEPPLER et al. (2010)  -Electricity price 
-CO2 allowances price 
-Calendar 
-Gas price 
-Coal price 
-Clean Spark Spread 
-Clean Dark Spread 
 
-In the first phase of EU 
ETS, there is a causality 
relationship between 
forward prices of CO2 
allowances and forward 
prices of electricity 
- This relationship is 
higher in base-load  
because the coal is more 
intensive in carbon 
-In the second phase, the 
relationship is inverted, 
and is the price of 
Data: 2005 to 2007, in 
Europe 
Source(s): BlueNext 
and EEX 
Methodology: 
Granger Causality tests 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
electricity  that determine 
the price of CO2 
allowances 
ZACHMANN et al. 
(2008) 
 -Electricity price 
-CO2 allowances price 
-Natural Gas price 
-They found convincing 
evidence that emissions 
prices are passed through 
asymmetrically to 
electricity futures prices in 
Germany 
Data: 2005 to 2006, in 
Germany 
Sources: European 
Energy Exchange, 
European Climate 
Exchange 
Methodology: VECM 
PERRELES et al. 
(2006a) 
 -Electricity price 
-Electricity price at time 
 t-1 and t-2 
-CO2 allowances price 
-Hydro-reservoir filling 
-Utilization rate of 
productivity capacity 
-Utilization rate of 
Swedish-Finnish 
transmission capacity 
- Dummy for weekend 
days 
-Dummy for holidays 
-Deviation from the 
average long term daily 
temperature in Finland 
-Monthly price of natural 
gas in Finland for very 
large users 
-75% to 95% of a CO2 
allowances price is passed 
on to the Finnish Nord 
Pool spot price  
-the spot price of 
electricity will be less 
affected by CO2 
allowances price if more 
capacity is installed. 
Data: between 
February 7th, 2005 and 
May 7th, 2006, for 
Finland 
Source(s): NordPool, 
Nordel, Statistics 
Finland,  Argus, Heren 
Energy, Finnish 
Meteorological 
Institute 
Methodology:  
ARIMA, AR-GARCH 
models 
PERRELES et al. 
(2006b) 
 -Electricity price 
-Electricity price at time 
 t-1 and t-2 
-CO2 allowances price 
-Hydro-reservoir filling 
-Utilization rate of 
productivity capacity 
-Utilization rate of 
Swedish-Finnish 
-75% to 95% of a CO2 
allowances price is passed 
on to the Finnish Nord 
Pool spot price 
-the spot price of 
electricity will be less 
affected by CO2 
allowances price if more 
Data: between 
February 7th, 2005 and 
May 7th, 2006, for 
Finland 
Source(s): NordPool, 
Nordel, Statistics 
Finland,  Argus, Heren 
Energy, Finnish 
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Study Hypothesis Dependent Variable(s) Explanatory variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
transmission capacity 
- Dummy for weekend 
days 
-Dummy for holidays 
-Deviation from the 
average long term daily 
temperature in Finland 
-Monthly price of natural 
gas in Finland for very 
large users 
-Coal price 
capacity is installed. Meteorological 
Institute 
Methodology:  
ARMA, AR-GARCH, 
VECM models 
BUNN et al. (2007)  -Electricity prices 
-Carbon prices 
-Gas prices 
-Atmospheric temperature 
-dummy variables 
in order to capture the 
huge drop in carbon price 
over three days, following 
news of the settlement 
-carbon price is important 
in determination of price 
of electricity and natural 
gas  
- carbon pass-through to 
electricity price only 
happen after some days 
- one shock of 1% in 
carbon causes on average 
one shock of 0.42% in 
electricity price 
Data: 2005-2006, for 
United Kingdom 
Source(s): UKPX, 
NBP, University of 
Dayton and Platts 
Methodology:  SVAR 
ABADIE et al. (2011)  -Electricity prices 
-CO2 allowances price 
-Coal price 
-Natural gas price 
-markets are incorporating 
the prices of emission 
allowances in the price of 
electricity in future 
Data: between 
12/01/2009 and 
11/30/2010 for 
European Markets 
Source(s): 
Intercontinental 
Exchange (ICE) 
Methodology:  Panel 
Data 
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Appendix B 
 
Figure 6 - Relationship between the price of electricity in base load for Portugal, CO2 allowances price 
and coal price 
 
Source: developed with data 
 
Figure 7- Relationship between electricity price in base load for Spain, CO2 allowances price and coal 
price 
 Source: developed with data  
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Figure 8 - Relationship between electricity price in peak load for Portugal, CO2 allowances price and 
oil price 
 
Source: developed with data 
 
Figure 9- Relationship between electricity price in peak load for Spain, CO2 allowances price and oil 
prices 
Source: developed with data   
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Table 13 - Tests for unit roots 
 
 Dickey-Fuller Test 
tcrit 5%= -2,86 
Phillips-Perron Test 
rhocrit 5%= -14,100 / tcrit 5%= -2,86 
 tobs p-value rhoobs tobs p-value 
           
          
 -4,118 0,0009 -15,021 -2,935 0,0414 
             
          
 -4,796 0,0001 -20,633 -2,577 0,0095 
              
          
 -4,692 0,0001 -20,350 -3,331 0,0136 
              
          
 -5,055 0,0000 -23,538 -3,573 0,0063 
    -0,843 0,8062 -2,325 -0,882 0,7937 
      -1,268 0,6437 -6,174 -1,814 0,3737 
     -0,958 0,7682 -2,305 -0,920 0,7813 
    -6,538 0,0000 -59,581 -5,529 0,0000 
    -4,664 0,0001 -27,868 -3,733 0,0037 
     -7,015 0,0000 -70,460 -6,080 0,0000 
     -4,453 0,0002 -25,465 -3,594 0,0059 
 
Source: developed with data 
 
 
Table 14 - Johansen cointegration test 
Model 1 – BaseLoad PT, CO2, Coal, TPT, TPT
2
 
Max Rank Parms LL Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 5% Critical value 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
30 
39 
46 
51 
54 
55 
-10698,507 
-10611,786 
-10590,227 
-10570,747 
-10566,874 
-10566,336 
- 
0,160 
0,042 
0,039 
0,008 
0,001 
264,341 
90,899 
47,882 
8,821* 
1,076 
68,520 
47,210 
29,680 
15,410 
3,760 
Model 2 – PeakLoad PT, CO2, Oil, TPT, TPT
2
 
Max Rank Parms LL Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 5% Critical value 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
30 
39 
46 
51 
54 
55 
-11240,259 
-11152,673 
-11128,843 
-11111,133 
-11109,244 
-11109,243 
- 
0,162 
0,047 
0,035 
0,004 
0,000 
262,031 
86,859 
39,199 
3,780* 
0,001 
68,520 
47,210 
29,680 
15,410 
3,760 
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Source: developed with data 
Model 3 –Base Load SP, CO2, Coal, TSP, TSP
2 
Max Rank Parms LL Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 5% Critical value 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
30 
39 
46 
51 
54 
55 
-11038,571 
-10997,607 
-10970,151 
-10961,176 
-10957,463 
-10956,903 
- 
0,080 
0,054 
0,018 
0,007 
0,001 
163,336 
81,409 
26,497* 
8,547 
1,121 
68,520 
47,210 
29,680 
15,410 
3,760 
 
Model 4 –Peak Load SP, CO2, Oil, TSP, TSP
2 
Max Rank Parms LL Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 5% Critical value 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
30 
39 
46 
51 
54 
55 
-11555,078 
-11512,797 
-11490,853 
-11481,619 
-11479,771 
-11479,764 
- 
0,082 
0,043 
0,018 
0,004 
0,000 
150,628 
66,064 
22,177* 
3,709 
0,014 
68,520 
47,210 
29,680 
15,410 
3,760 
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Table 15 - Correlation matrix 
Source: developed with data 
  
 
 
BaseLoadPT PeakLoadPT BaseLoadSP PeakLoadSP TPT TSP CO2 Oil Coal TPT
2
 TSP
2
 
BaseLoadPT 1,000           
PeakLoadPT 0,991 1,000          
BaseLoadSP 0,979 0,972 1,000         
PeakLoadSP 0,969 0,980 0,986 1,000        
TPT 0,103 0,097 0,116 0,116 1,000       
TSP 0,136 0,126 0,158 0,151 0,898 1,000      
CO2 0,592 0,573 0,539 0,540 0,199 0,235 1,000     
Oil 0,328 0,335 0,380 0,377 0,181 0,226 0,289 1,000    
Coal 0,726 0,726 0,752 0,756 0,112 0,167 0,630 0,749 1,000   
TPT
2
 0,090 0,088 0,103 0,107 0,987 0,875 0,168 0,161 0,097 1,000  
TSP
2
 0,126 0,122 0,151 0,150 0,854 0,973 0,196 0,187 0,153 0,854 1,000 
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Appendix C 
 
Table 16 - Annual external transactions of allowances for Portugal 
Transfers and 
acquisitions 
2008 2009 2010 
Addiction Subtraction Addiction Subtraction Addiction Subtraction 
Germany (DE) 0 397.117 3.003.316 115.691 0 2.665.152 
Czech Republic 
(CZ) 
0 0 2.607.082 0 297.000 0 
France (FR) 451.000 864.189 930.045 6.312.292 614.254 4.749.465 
Great Britain (GB) NO 1.457.944 4.162.000 1.462.794 384.733 3.199.475 
Estonia (EE) 0 0 0 0 1.905 0 
Spain (ES) 222.500 317.559 2.065.421 7.602.846 2.522.367 1.493.675 
Denmark (DK) 2.828.001 2.623.005 12.491.009 10.953.059 5.000 58.000 
Italy (IT) 2.000 2.000 131.522 21.522 3 394.001 
Belgium (BE) 0 20.625 0 27.201 0 0 
Ireland (IE) 0 0 0 50.000 0 140.000 
Liechtenstein (LI) 0 0 0 0 100.000 0 
Latvia (LV) 0 0 2.000.000 0 2.000.000 0 
Netherlands (NL) 0 0 629.000 494.410 224.163 283.210 
Norway (NO) 0 0 0 0 200.000 0 
Romania (RO) 0 0 0 0 0 85.000 
European Union 
(EU) 
0 2.235.418 0 0 0 0 
Sub-total 3.503.501 7.917.857 28.019.395 27.039.815 6.349.425 13.067.978 
 
Source: National Inventory Submissions, United Nations – Framework Convention for Climate Change,  
Available in http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/national_inventories_submissions/items/5888.php 
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Table 17 - Annual external transactions of allowances for Spain 
Transfers and 
acquisitions 
2008 2009 2010 
Addiction Subtraction Addiction Subtraction Addiction Subtraction 
Austria (AT) 80.000 80.000 2.017.879 73.286 0 175.000 
Belgium (BE) 1 81.289 5.000 1.601.396 404.251 1.579.888 
Czech Republic (CZ) 75.000 0 5.128.500 0 1.000.000 0 
Germany (DE) 2.545.515 4.088.426 4.259.125 1.247.232 8.664.784 1.649.130 
Denmark(DK) 1.031.000 434.006 28.027.721 8.808.697 121.371 7.392.111 
European Union (EU) 0 10.229.902 0 0 0 0 
Estonia(EE) 0 0 0 0 6.285.714 0 
Finland (FI) 100.000 41.490 0 80.359 1.200 47.390 
France (FR) 881.261 4.700.509 4.567.442 31.542.605 9.250.217 7.649.908 
Great Britain(GB) 10.897.316 11.243.141 5.346.884 22.791.958 7.118.555 27.095.990 
Greece (GR) 0 0 0 0 70.000 0 
Hungary (HU) 6.650.000 0 39.300 0 0 0 
Ireland (IE) 14.000 1.500 360.954 227.400 421.000 646.500 
Italy (IT) 4.500 19.500 475.315 69.594 2.270.438 8.273.560 
Japan (JP) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg (LU) 0 0 0 310.000 0 0 
Latvia (LV) 0 20.000 5.000.000 0 0 0 
Netherlands (NL) 355.000 1.622.503 527.482 999.398 1.666.060 3.105.302 
Norway(NO) 0 0 0 0 133.961 133.961 
Poland (PL) 0 0 1.084.100 31.100 3.199.791 302.200 
Portugal (PT) 317.559 222.500 7.602.846 2.065.421 1.493.675 2.522.367 
Romania (RO) 0 0 0 0 40.000 30.000 
Sweden (SE) 0 10.000 0 0 0 0 
63 
 
Transfers and 
acquisitions 
2008 2009 2010 
Addiction Subtraction Addiction Subtraction Addiction Subtraction 
Slovenia (SI) 13.820 0 0 0 1.424 0 
Ukraine (UA) 0 0 3.236.254 0 0 0 
Sub-total 22.964.972 32.794.766 67.678.802 69.848.446 42.142.441 60.603.307 
 
Source: National Inventory Submissions, United Nations – Framework Convention for Climate Change,  
Available in http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/national_inventories_submissions/items/5888.php 
